![]() ![]() Over the past decade, the bulk of intellectual energy has been expended studying counterinsurgency theory and practice. ![]() Several factors are to blame for the Corps’ failure to institutionalize maneuver doctrine. When one civilian visitor to the CAX at Twentynine Palms said that it did not seem to reflect maneuver warfare, the senior Marine officer replied, “Marine Corps doctrine is maneuver warfare, so anything Marines do is maneuver warfare.” For the most part, Marines have been content to apply the terminology of maneuver warfare to their accustomed practice of attrition warfare, often to a degree that verges on the farcical. But these usually last only until the next commander arrives, when the second generation sea sweeps over the island. Individual commanders of units and schools have here and there attempted to change what the Marine Corps does to match what it says, creating “islands” of maneuver warfare. Krulak when he was Commandant, began with promise, but received no long-term support. Attempts to move forward since that time, such as the Jaeger air experiments sponsored by Gen Charles C. With Gen Gray’s retirement, that is where the effort largely stopped. The Corps issued a set of excellent doctrinal manuals, starting with FMFM-1, Warfighting, and including MCDP 1-1, Campaigning, which focused on the operational level of war, MCDP 1-3, Tactics, and MCDP-6, Command and Control. In the early 1990s, the United States Marine Corps officially adopted maneuver warfare, also known as Third Generation War, as doctrine, in a movement led by then-Commandant Gen Alfred M. By Capt Daniel R Grazier & William S Lind ![]()
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